This paper presents a modified realizability interpretation of classical linear logic. The interpretation is based on work of de , Blass (1995), and Shirahata (2006) 
Introduction
This paper presents a modified realizability interpretation of classical linear logic. A completeness result is obtained for the interpretation with the help of a simple form of branching quantifier. Proof-theoretic applications such as closure and conservation properties are also discussed.
The realizability interpretation presented here is based on work of de Paiva [16, 17] and Shirahata [19] on the Dialectica interpretation [11] of linear logic. In fact, the treatment of all the connectives of linear logic follows [17] verbatim. The difference comes solely in the interpretation of the exponentials. The shift to the modified realizability comes from the author's work on the unifying framework for functionals interpretations [15] and Blass' comments at the end of [4] suggesting a simplification on de Paiva's work. Whereas de Paiva's work on the Dialectica interpretation aimed at the construction of categorical models of linear logic, our interpretation is presented as an endointerpretation of proofs, which does not leave the realm of classical linear logic. The advantage is that we obtain stronger versions of the disjunction and existence properties for extensions of classical linear logic, and new conservation results for certain choice principles.
Intuitively, functional interpretations such as the Dialectica interpretation [11, 17] and Kreisel's modified realizability [14] associate formulas with one-move games between two players (∃loise and ∀belard) and proofs with winning strategies for ∃loise. The interpretation of each of the logical connectives, quantifiers and exponentials corresponds to constructions that build new games out of given games. In the case of classical linear logic, the interpretation is totally symmetric with respect to linear negation, so that the game corresponding to A ⊥ is the game A with the roles of the two players swapped. The modified realizability presented here interprets the exponentials as games where only one player needs to make a move. For instance, in the game ?A, only ∀belard makes a move, and ∃loise will win in case she has a winning move for the game A with the given ∀belard's move. A symmetric situation occurs in the case of the game !A, only that ∀belard now has the advantage. The idea is that the exponentials ? and ! serve as trump cards for ∃loise and ∀belard, respectively.
Researchers familiar with linear logic will no doubt be also familiar with its constructive aspect. For those, the possibility of a realizability interpretation of classical linear logic may come as no surprise. For proof theorists less familiar with linear logic, however, it may seem hard to believe that modified realizability can be directly applied to a classical system, given that modified realizability interpretations of classical systems are normally only possible via an initial embedding of the classical system into an intuitionistic variant. Moreover, that often needs to be followed by Friedman's A-translation in order to eliminate double negations in front of Σ 0 1 -formulas, if one is interested in the provably total functions of the system. As we will see, none of this is necessary in the case of classical linear logic.
The paper is organised as follows. The modified realiz- [16, 19] .
In the final section, we discuss the semantical aspect of the interpretation and related work.
For an introduction to modified realizability, see chapter III of [20] or the book chapter [21] . For an introduction to linear logic, see Girard's original papers [9, 10] .
Classical Linear Logic LL ω
We work with an extension of classical linear logic to the language of all finite types. The set of finite types T is inductively defined as follows:
For simplicity, we deal with only one basic finite type o. 
Remark 1.1 (Finite types extension)

1).
The linear negation A ⊥ of an arbitrary formula A is an abbreviation as follows:
So, (A ⊥ ) ⊥ is syntactically equal to A. We will often write A ↔ B as a shorthand for the fact that both A B and B A are provable. The rules for classical linear logic are shown in Table 1 , with the usual side condition in the rule (∀) that the variable z must not appear free in Γ. We postpone the treatment of the additives to Section 5, since our treatment of these is rather unconventional.
Our formulation of the rules of classical linear logic differs slightly from Girard's original formulation in [10] :≡ |A|
Notice that for atomic formulas the tuples of witnesses and challenges are both empty (and hence omitted). We extend that interpretation to all formulas
Note that, given a formula |A| Let us look at a simple example. For instance, consider the valid formula
∀yA at (y)).
Following the description of the interpretation we have:
The treatment of the linear implication gives
Finally, the bang ! makes the challenge variable explicit
A proof of A will then provide a witness t and a verification proof of |A| t . In this simple case, the shortest proof of A will give us the identity term t = λy.y.
Following the intuition of games, the interpretation can be understood as follows. The game A B consists of two simultaneous games A and B, where ∃loise must win game B given that ∀belard wins game A. More precisely, her move in the game A B is a pair of copying strategies (f , g) transforming any of ∀belard's move x in game A into her move gx in game B, and also any of ∀belard's move w in game B into her move fw in game A. In the case of the game A ⊗ B, ∃loise must make moves in both games A and B, while ∀belard may use ∃loise's move in game A to choose his move in game B, and ∃loise's move in game B to choose his move in game A.
It is only in the quantifier games ∃zA(z) and ∀zA(z) that the players have to produce a "card" z. In the case of ∃zA(z), ∃loise has to produce z and make a move on the game A(z). ∀belard's move in the game A(z) can depend on ∃loise's choice z. Once again, for the game ∀zA(z) the situation is totally symmetric, so that the onus of producing the witness falls on ∀belard.
The exponential games ?A and !A can be thought as playing the game A several times. In the case of the game !A, ∀belard has an advantage since ∃loise's move has to be uniform for all copies of the game. ∀belard, however, can try a different move on each copy of the game, which is equivalent to ∀belard having the chance to play his best possible move to challenge ∃loise's move. The roles are reversed in the ?A game.
The following lemma, which is an adaptation of a lemma due to Shirahata [19] , formalises the idea that the interpretation of A ⊥ is identical to that of A save that the roles of players ∃loise and ∀belard are inverted. For instance, the formula !?(∀xA at (x)⊗∃yB at (y)) is not a fixed formula, while !∀x(A at (x) ⊗ ?∃yB at (y)) is a fixed formula. Fixed formulas are linear logic counterparts of ∃-free formulas which are used in connection with realizability interpretation of intuitionistic logic (cf.
Definition 2.3 (Fixed formulas)
[21], remark after 3.4). Such formulas have interesting properties with respect to the realizability interpretation. For instance:
• for any formula A, its interpretation |A| x y is a fixed formula;
• if A is a fixed formula then |A| ≡ A and the sequence of witnessing and challenge variables in its interpretation are empty;
• in particular, we have that the interpretation above is idempotent, i.e. the interpretation of |A| is syntactically equal to |A| itself.
Soundness of the Interpretation
We prove now the soundness of the realizability interpretation, i.e. we show that any formula provable in classical linear logic has (provably in classical linear logic) a realizer. 
then terms a 0 , . . . , a n , b can be extracted from this proof such that
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of A 0 , . . . , A n B. The only rule where free-variables matter is the universal quantifier rule. Therefore, for all the other rules we will assume that the tuple of parameters z is empty. The cases of the axiom and the permutation rule are trivial. The other rules are treated as follows:
Tensor. Contraction.
Weakening.
Note that the assumption that the tuple of variables x (respectively x − ) does not appear free in the term a (respectively a − ) is used crucially in the soundness of the cut rule in order remove any circularity in the two simultaneous substitutions.
Universal quantifier.
Existential quantifier.
This concludes the proof. We discuss the case of the disjunction property in Section 5, where we treat the additive connectives.
Completeness of the Interpretation
In this section we investigate the completeness of the realizability interpretation. The Soundness Theorem 3.1 tells us that whenever Γ A then for terms a[v], γ[y] we also have
treating, for simplicity, the context Γ as a single formula. Our goal is to define a minimal extension of LL ω over which having ( * ) also implies that Γ A. Since the interpretation of A will normally have more free-variables than the formula A, we must choose how to quantify over these variables. Given that a is independent of y, and γ is independent of v, one might be tempted to say that a sequent Γ A is interpreted as
As discussed in [4] , interpretation (1) is not in general sound for the logical axioms. Given the rule (⊥), formulas in the premise of the sequent must be given a dual interpretation to the formula in the conclusion. Therefore, one might try also to consider the alternative possibility
Interpretation (2) validates the axioms but will not validate the cut rule, since we will need ∀y∃x|A| x y ∃x∀y|A| x y . In order to obtain an interpretation between options (1) and (2), we use a simple form of branching quantification, to be called simultaneous quantifiers AE With the sequent ( * ) in mind, the simultaneous quantifier aims at capturing both the global dependence (a depends on v) and local independence (a does not depend on y) of the witnessing terms. The logical rule for this simple form of branching quantifier is:
A0 (x0, a0) with the two side-conditions:
• x i may only appear free in the terms b or a j , for j = i;
• w may only appear free in the terms a i .
In particular, we will have that w and each x i will not be free in the conclusion of the rule. Note that we might have x i ∈ FV(a j ) ∪ FV(b), for j = i, and w ∈ FV(a i ).
The standard quantifier rules can be obtained from this single rule. The rule (∀) can be obtained in the case when x i , a i and b are empty. The rule (∃) can be obtained in the case when x i , a i and w are empty. Hence, for the rest of this section we will consider that standard quantifiers ∀xA and ∃xA are in fact abbreviations for AE x A and AE x A, respectively. [5, 12] , in which no alternation of quantifiers is allowed on the two branches.
Remark 4.1 (Relation to Henkin quantifiers) According to Hyland [13] (footnote 18), "the identification of a sufficiently simple tensor as a Henkin quantifier is a common feature of a number of interpretations of linear logic". The simultaneous quantifier can be viewed as a simplification of Henkin's (branching) quantifier
In terms of games, the simple branching quantifier embodies the idea of the two players performing their moves simultaneously. The most interesting characteristic of this simultaneous quantifier is with respect to linear negation, which is defined as ( AE 
The converses of these implications, however, require extra logical principles. Let A and B be fixed formulas (cf. Definition 2.3), and consider the following principles for the simultaneous quantifier
We refer to these as the sequential choice AC s , parallel choice AC p , and trump advantage TA. 
Lemma 4.4 The principles
Γ[γ 0 ] A Γ[γ 1 ] B (3 z ) Γ[(z)(γ 0 , γ 1 )] A 3 z B Γ A (3 t ) Γ A 3 t B Γ B (3 f ) Γ A 3 f B
Dealing with the Additives
In this section we discuss how the realizability interpretation of Section 2 can be extended to deal with the additive connectives. We will deviate from the standard formulation of linear logic, in the sense that we will use the if-thenelse logical constructor A 3 z B instead of standard additive conjunction and disjunction 4 . The logical rules for 3 z are shown in Table 2 , where (z)(γ 0 , γ 1 ) denotes a conditional λ-term which reduces to either γ 0 or γ 1 depending on whether the boolean variable z reduces to true or false, respectively. The standard additives can be defined as
with the help of quantification over booleans 5 . The if-thenelse connective is self-dual, i.e.
The realizability interpretation given in Definition 2.1 can be extended to deal with the if-then-else construct as Moreover, notice that the functionals x and v in the case of ∧ (y and w in the case of ∨) do not need to have access to the boolean z, since they will only be relevant when z = t and z = f, respectively. The interpretation can then be simplified as In terms of games, given two games A and B, the additive combinations of those games, i.e. A ∧ B and A ∨ B, correspond to two games being played simultaneously, but only the outcome of one of those games will count at the end. The game whose outcome will count depends on whether it is an and (∧) game or an or (∨) game. In the first case, ∀belard must choose not only two moves y, w, but he chooses also a boolean deciding which game he wants to count. In the case of the or-game, ∃loise has the choice of which games is to be considered.
The Soundness Theorem 3.1 remains true for the extension with the if-then-else connective. For instance, the conditional abstraction is treated as follows:
Using the abbreviation B∨C :≡ ∃z(B 3 z C), Corollary 3.2 implies the following disjunction property. 
Relation to Kreisel's Modified Realizability
In this section we describe how the interpretation of linear logic presented above indeed corresponds to Kreisel's modified realizability interpretation [14] of intuitionistic logic. We will assume that intuitionistic logic is also formalised with the if-then-else connective A 3 b B, so that conjunction and disjunction are defined notions.
First, consider a variation of Girard's embedding of intuitionistic logic into our version of linear logic with conditionals.
Definition 6.1 ([9]) For any formula A of intuitionistic logic its linear translation A is defined inductively as
The translation is such that Γ IL ω A if and only if !(Γ ) LL ω A , for all formulas Γ, A in the language of intuitionistic logic.
Let "x mr A" denote the modified realizability interpretation of A, read as "x modified realizes A". The next theorem basically states that the diagram of Figure 1 commutes.
Theorem 6.2 Let
A be a formula of intuitionistic logic.
It is easy to check that the embedding of a formula A of classical logic into linear logic via the translation:
is equivalent to a ∀-fixed formula, i.e. ∀xA, with A a fixed formula. This implies that the realizability interpretation of A Q does not have any positive computational content, and that the universal closure of the realizability interpretation of A Q is equivalent to A Q itself. Intuitively, Girard's embedding of classical logic into linear logic "blocks" the realizability interpretation (Def. 2.1) in the same way that the negative translation "blocks" Kreisel's original realizability interpretation.
Parametrised Interpretation and LL ω
In [15] , a family of functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic has been described using a unifying framework. Such framework can be translated to the case of classical linear logic as follows. For each formula A, let ∀x < a A and ∃x < a A be formula abbreviations such that
A formula A is called <-fixed if it does not contain unbounded quantifiers and all bounded quantifiers ∀x < a A and ∃x < a A are immediately preceded by a ! and ?, respectively. For each <-fixed formula A, we require the abbreviations to satisfy the comonoid condition
and the comonad conditions
for families of sequence of terms , η and µ, one sequence of terms for each <-fixed formula A. The provability sign in the conditions stands for provability in the system under which the functional interpretation will be verified, which might be an extension of LL ω . For a sequence of formulas Γ ≡ A 0 , . . . , A n we will write ∀x < a Γ as a shorthand for ∀x 0 < a 0 A 0 , . . . , ∀x n < a n A n .
We can then show that, for any formula abbreviation satisfying conditions (C, D, P), a functional interpretation of classical linear logic can be obtained by defining the interpretation of the exponentials as |!A| The conditions (D, P) are used to ensure the soundness of the dereliction and promotion rules, respectively. For instance, the parametrised soundness of the promotion rule is derivable as follows:
). The step (+) in the derivation above corresponds to several steps in linear logic, assuming also that the abbreviation respects provability. The condition (C) is used for the soundness of the contraction rule.
Modified realizability is the case when the tuple a is empty and the formula abbreviations ∀x < a A and ∃x < a A are shorthand for ∀xA and ∃xA, respectively. It is easy to see that with this abbreviation, all the three conditions are satisfied for LL ω .
In the following, we briefly discuss three other instantiations of the parametrised interpretation, corresponding the Gödel's Dialectica interpretation [11] , its Diller-Nahm variant [6] , and the bounded functional interpretation [7] . For each variant we will focus on the requirements for the soundness theorem to go through. For lack of space we omit the proofs that these interpretations of classical linear logic indeed correspond (via the (·) -translation) to their respective interpretations of intuitionistic logic. The proof, however, is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.2.
As mentioned above, the parametrised formula construction is only necessary in the treatment of exponentials. Hence, in a fragment of linear logic without exponentials, all the functional interpretations we will discuss below coincide. This also means that the completeness proof of Section 4 can be reused, and only new principles for the completeness of the exponentials needs to be added. Using parametrised notation, the only new principle we need for the (parametrised) completeness of the exponentials is the linear logic counterpart of the Markov principle
where A is a <-fixed formula. With MP < we can obtain the equivalence between ! AE In the case of the modified realizability interpretation, MP < reduces to the trivial implication !∀xA !∀xA.
Gödel's Dialectica interpretation
In [11] , Gödel developed an interpretation of Heyting (first-order intuitionistic) arithmetic into a higher-order extension of primitive recursive arithmetic. Gödels' interpretation of arithmetic, known as the Dialectica interpretation, is based on top of an interesting interpretation of intuitionistic predicate logic. This interpretation has been adapted to an interpretation of propositional linear logic in [16, 17] , and later extended to first-order linear logic in [19] . Gödel's Dialectica interpretation of linear logic can be obtained from the parametrised interpretation by taking the abbreviations ∀x < a A and ∃x < a A to both mean A [a/x] . This leads to a variant of the interpretation given in Def. In this case, we must assume that quantifier-free formulas are decidable (a usual requirement for Dialectica interpretations) in order to satisfy the condition (C). Conditions (D, P) are easily seen to be satisfied in LL ω , with ηx := x and µhb := hb.
Besides being sound for the principles AC s , AC p and TA of Section 4, the Dialectica interpretation of LL ω will also interpret the corresponding instantiation of MP < , i.e.
(MP D ) ∀x!A !∀xA
where A is a quantifier-free formula.
The relation between functional interpretations and games is discussed in [4] (see also [1] ). As mentioned above, our modified realizability interpretation of the exponentials corresponds to a maximal advantage for each of the players, in the sense that the players are not required to make a move, but will win if their best possible move is a winning move. For an analysis of the different functional interpretations from a categorical-logic point of view see [13] , where linear logic is also discussed. 
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